matter of Essex's accomplice's non-existence is bracketed as indiscernible in this way, various interests and agendas become implicated as the drivers or foundations of opinions in the conflicting press data quoted. For example, the police who entered the building were shooting and being wounded throughout the day after Essex had been killed by a police marksman. The implication of the presence of a second shooter would be that the police had been shooting each other in the later stages of the siege. At a certain point, however, the adverse implication of there having been a second shooter (the police were incompetent in letting them escape) may outweigh the adverse implications of there not having been such a person (the police were panicked into shooting at each other). At this point, where the practical and political impetus favors the story of the lone gunman that was initially rejected, evidence that had previously been taken to support the identification of a second sniper is reinterpreted and put to work in supporting the new story of the solo shooter:

How could evidence be reassigned to unconstitute the Other? The very features that were used to constitute the second sniper came to be used to unconstitute that sniper. The features held to their empirical referents changed. (p. 44)

Wakler therefore helps us reflect on the taken-for-granted assumptions underlying our everyday interactions, particularly in relation to the process of creating and attributing features to Others. She shows us through this case study in empirical documentary detail how and why evidence of the existence or otherwise of things can be constituted, questioned, revised and reconstructed, producing rationalizations of why things are not but never resolving the basic uncertainty of that purported reality. In that regard, although she uses very few references and does not explicitly engage with any phenomenological writing, she is engaged in similar thinking to central phenomenological texts like Folk Deaths and Moral Points in exhuming the discursive processes of the constitution and recognition of public, official and media interpretations of a situation in which each may reach different conclusions as to what happened, sometimes using the same items of 'evidence' to justify their different viewpoints.

The idea of the Other has been well used in criminology, and in a variety of different ways, from David Garland's dichotomy of criminologies to Jock Young's analyses of exclusion. The process under discussion tends to be the constitution rather than unconstitution of the Other—processes that more or less actively exclude, blame and caricature Others—although there are also investigations of the process of denial of the Other, as per Sibley and Matta, or more lately Stanley Cohen's sociology of moral cognition. While some of these processes of othering and unothering are clearly deeply entrenched, it seems helpful to focus on the extent to which they may be amenable to change—a focus that is enhanced by Schutz's view of our background knowledge as taken for granted but only 'still further notice' (Schutz 1962: 24; Berger and Luckmann 1967: 58). Wakler's study illustrates how difficult giving people that further notice can be when one's analytical perspective is of a life-world in which fact are always and only items that are perceived or experienced, and in which all perceptions and interpretations of experience have a history and a mandate:

The world is never given to the subject and the communities of subjects in any other way than as the subjectively relative world with particular experiential content and as a world which, in and

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through subjectivity, takes on ever new transformations of meaning. (Husserl 1970 [1954], cited at p. 26)

With no clear sense of the underlying reality of the situation presented in the book, we are taken through the processes of constitution, reconstitution and ultimately unconstitution of the Other in a way that shows these realities being fashioned and refashioned by the actors and commentators engaged in the text. No reliable link to any 'true' situation as an object.

A difficult background issue is the pristine condition in which the phenomenological perspective is presented in the text. The first quote above, for example, of features holding while empirical referents change is reminiscent of the signifier/signified code in Saussurean semiotics. Yet, no such obvious connections or diversions are made in the text, whether by way of synthesis or differentiation. Instead, the author opts for continual excerpts from Husserl by way of sometimes marginally frustratingly opaque support for a phenomenological approach to the process of constitution that seems to encompass many other fundamentally necessary concepts, perspectives and tools without any need to render them visible in their own right.

The book, however, is explicitly an exercise in thought and analysis that is fully built on one approach, and so conceptual cross-referring and unpacking are not part of the remit.

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